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ABSTRACT
Denial of Service Attacks:
Path Reconstruction for IP Traceback Using Adjusted Probabilistic Packet
Marking. (December 2004)
Raghav Dube, B.E., Motilal Nehru Regional Engineering College, Allahabad, India
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Deepa Kundur
The use of Internet has revolutionized the way information is exchanged, changed
business paradigms and put mission critical and sensitive systems online. Any dis-
ruption of this connectivity and the plethora of services provided results in significant
damages to everyone involved. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are becoming increas-
ingly common and are the cause of lost time and revenue.
Flooding type DoS attacks use spoofed IP addresses to disguise the attackers.
This makes identification of the attackers extremely difficult. This work proposes a
new scheme that allows the victim of a DoS attack to identify the correct origin of the
malicious traffic. The suggested mechanism requires routers to mark packets using
adjusted probabilistic marking. This results in a lower number of packet-markings
required to identify the traffic source. Unlike many related works, we use the existing
IPv4 header structure to incorporate these markings. We simulate and test our
algorithms using real Internet trace data to show that our technique is fast, and
works successfully for a large number of distributed attackers.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are increasingly becoming a security threat and nui-
sance for the Internet community, especially online businesses and mission-critical
systems. These attacks result in system downtime, lost revenues, and the physical la-
bor involved in identifying and recovering from such attacks. Denial of service (DoS)
attacks consume the resources of a host or a network. The host or network is thereby
unable to provide the expected service to legitimate users. Increased availability of
Internet access and high-end computer systems has made DoS attacks more severe
and easy to execute. With many “over-the-counter” tools being available for creating
trojans, viruses and back-doors, it is getting increasingly simple, even for a person
not having an in-depth knowledge of computer systems, to launch DoS attacks. Ac-
cording to the 2004 Computer Security Institute/FBI Computer Crime and Security
survey [1], DoS attacks were responsible for more than $26 million in total losses
among those surveyed. Recent denial of service attacks on web sites operated by
Microsoft Corporation, Yahoo! Inc., and Google [2], [3], [4] are perfect examples of
how these attacks affect businesses as well as customers accessing their services.
A. Denial of Service Attacks
A Denial of Service attack is a process of blocking access to data or systems wherein
a user or organization is deprived of resources they would normally expect to have.
Denial of Service Attacks may be classified into two basic types:
1. Logic or Software Attacks : These attacks exploit software bugs at the targeted
The journal model is IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking.
2system. Only a few packets are required to disrupt the normal functioning of
the victim of the attack.
2. Flood Attacks : The attacker directs a large volume of traffic to the victim. This
high-volume traffic overwhelms the victim’s resources, or may simply take up
network bandwidth.
Henceforth, the system that initiates a DoS attack shall be referred to as the
“attacker”, and the system that is the target of the attack shall be referred to as the
“victim”. Let us now look at some logic- and flood-type DoS attacks.
Examples of logic-type DoS attacks are:
• Ping of Death: The attacker sends an oversized IP packet [5], [6] to the tar-
geted system. The legal size limit for IP packets is 65,535 bytes. The attacker
fragments an oversized IP packet and sends them to the victim. When the
fragments are reassembled by the victim into a complete packet, it overflows
the buffer on some systems, causing a reboot or hang.
• Teardrop Attack : The attacker sends IP fragments that cannot be reassembled
properly. This causes the victim to reboot or hang.
Examples of flood-type DoS attacks are:
• TCP SYN Flood Attack [7]: This attack exploits the 3-way handshake used for
a TCP [8] connection setup. The attacker sends a TCP SYN request to the
victim using a spoofed IP address. The victim responds with a TCP SYN-
ACK response and allocates memory for the potential connection. It waits for
an acknowledgement (TCP ACK) from the attacker. However, since the IP
address is spoofed, the victim does not receive a response from the attacker.
3After a certain period of time, called the time-out interval, the victim closes
the half-open connection and frees up the reserved memory. Since the memory
resources at the victim are limited, if the attacker sends enough connection
requests, and fast enough, it can tie-up the resources of the victim. Thus,
connections from legitimate users cannot be processed.
• UDP Flood Attack : UDP [9] does not require any connection setup procedure
to transfer data. An attacker sends UDP packets to random ports on the
victim system. Since there have been no service requests from these ports, the
victim has effectively wasted CPU cycles and memory resources to process these
packets. Large number of such packets tie-up the victim’s resources. And since
UDP does not have congestion control, this attack can also be used to target
the bandwidth resources of the victim’s network.
• Smurf IP Attack : Forged ICMP [10] packets are sent by the attacker to the
broadcast address of a network. All the systems on the network then send an
ICMP reply back to the victim. This large volume of replies inundates the
victim’s bandwidth.
• Mail Bomb: A mail server can fail if a very large number of bogus emails are
sent in a very short time.
The focus of this research is on flood-type DoS attacks.
B. IP Traceback
As seen in the previous section, an attacker may employ different techniques to flood
a victim’s resources and to avoid detection. An easy way to avoid detection is to use
spoofed IP addresses in the packets that are sent.
4Several mechanisms have been proposed to deal with the problem of Denial of
Service Attacks. While some of these mechanisms focus on detecting a DoS attack
and filtering the malicious traffic, others focus on identifying the source of the attack
itself. These methods may be used in conjunction with each other to provide a
comprehensive defense mechanism against DoS attacks.
Traffic in a DoS attack usually uses spoofed IP addresses. This makes it difficult
to determine the source of the traffic. Hence, it becomes imperative that techniques
to accurately determine the real source of the attack traffic, or the path traversed by
the packets be developed and used to mitigate the DoS attack. This work uses IP
traceback to identify the source of the DoS attack. IP traceback is used to determine
the path followed by a packet, that is, trace a packet back to its source (or attacker).
Figure 1 shows a DoS attack scenario. An attacker sends high-volume traffic to
its target. The packets comprising the attack are forwarded by the routers to their
destination. An IP traceback mechanism enables the victim to know the about the
routers that are forwarding the packets, and hence trace the packets’ path back to its
source, the attacker.
An IP header [5], shown in Figure 2, is used by routers to route a packet. Since
all the routers along the path from the source to the destination of a packet process
this header, it becomes an obvious choice for determining the path traversed by the
packet. This header can be used to send information useful for traceback. Each
router along a packet’s path marks the packet with some unique information. The
destination system (or victim) uses this information to reconstruct the path, and
hence determine the real source of the DoS attack.
5Fig. 1. A Simple Denial of Service(DoS) Attack Scenario.
C. Contribution of this Work
We propose a new traceback algorithm that employs adjusted router marking prob-
ability. No modification or addition to the IP header is required. The existing IP
identification field is used to mark the packets. We show mathematically and through
simulations that our packet marking technique requires a lower number of packets for
reconstruction.
The victim uses existing tools to obtain a map of the Internet and reconstruct
the attack path using the map and the packet markings. For a high-volume DoS, this
means faster identification of the sources of the traffic.
D. Organization of Thesis
Chapter I provided a brief introduction to Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and their
types. This chapter also described the contribution of this research.
6Fig. 2. IPv4 Header.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II throws light on some
of the related work done by researchers in the area of IP traceback and discusses
the advantages and disadvantages of these methods. The proposed algorithm and a
detailed mathematical analysis is provided in Chapter III. Chapter IV presents the
simulation methodology, results and the interpretation of the findings. Chapter V
concludes this thesis and discusses the future scope and applications of this work.
7CHAPTER II
CURRENT RESEARCH AND RELATED WORK
Since the goal of this work is identifying the source of DoS attacks using IP traceback,
and not filtering traffic, we shall discuss related work in this area in detail. However,
for the sake of completeness, some DoS traffic filtering algorithms are also mentioned.
Network Ingress [11] and Egress [12] Filtering are preemptive measures to stop
DoS attacks that use spoofed IP addresses. An Internet Service Provider’s (ISP)
aggregation point filters out traffic that does not belong to its network. This method is
not effective against DoS attacks that use legitimate IP addresses, or zombie machines.
Gil and Poletto [13] have proposed MULTOPS, a data structure that can be
used to detect flooding type DoS attacks. The algorithm uses the fact that during a
DoS attack, there is a considerable difference between the traffic rates going to, and
coming from the victim of the attack.
Yaar, Perrig and Song [14] have developed a Path Identifier algorithm that can
be used to filter DoS attack traffic based on unique path identifying markings in the
packet. Their filtering scheme is based on routers marking packets as they route
them, creating a unique path-fingerprint that the victim can then use to filter traffic.
They propose that routers mark the last n bits of their IP address into one of the
⌊16/n⌋ sections of the IP identification field. The packet’s TTL value modulo ⌊16/n⌋
is used to determine which section to mark. They also propose an edge marking
to increase the accuracy of their scheme. However, the algorithm proposed by Yaar
et al., although uses router marking, is a DoS attack traffic detection and filtering
mechanism, rather than a DoS attack source identification algorithm.
IP traceback has been discussed in Section B of Chapter I. The following schemes
employ some form of an IP traceback mechanism to determine the source of the DoS
8attack.
Doeppner, Klein and Koyfman [15] introduce a deterministic router stamping
algorithm wherein each router that routes a packet appends its IP address to a new,
variable length field in the IP header. Clearly, this is not a practical solution as this
would mean that for a large path length, the IP header would expand by 120 bytes.
To overcome this problem, the authors describe a probabilistic marking algorithm
that requires routers to mark packets with a stamp that consists of the router’s IP
address and the interface on which the packet was received. Routers mark a packet
with probability p, and place the marking into one of s slots in the IP header. The
parameters p and s are constant. For each packet, the router calculates a random
number, x between 0 and 1. If x ≤ s · p, it marks the packet in slot ⌊x/p⌋, otherwise
it just routes the packet without marking.
The probability that the victim receives a packet having a marking from a router
k hops away is given by s ·p ·(1−p)(k−1). As the path length increases, the probability
of receiving a packet marked by the farthest router decreases rapidly. The authors
propose increasing the IP header size by 40 bytes for the probabilistic marking algo-
rithm.
Although the authors describe a source identification algorithm, they do not
present results showing its performance, simulated or otherwise.
Savage, Wetherall, Karlin and Anderson [16] propose a basic packet marking
algorithm in which each router along a path decides to mark a packet with a proba-
bility p. The routers mark the packets with their IP addresses. The victim receives a
packet marked by a router if that router marks the packet and no other router along
the path overwrites the marking. The probability that the victim receives a packet
marked by a router d hops away is thus equal to p · (1− p)(d−1).
We observe that, as the distance of the router from the victim decreases, the
9fraction of packets received by the victim that is marked by that router decreases
very rapidly. For a marking probability, p = 0.51, and a router 15 hops away, this
value is 2.3459x10−5. This means that 1 out of every 42, 627 packets received by the
victim has a marking by the router 15 hops away.
To overcome this problem, the authors propose other algorithms that encode
fragments of edge information in the packets rather than information about individual
nodes. An edge is a bit pattern that contains information about both, the current
router, and also the router from which the packet was received, thus describing an
“edge”. Each router writes, with marking probability p, onto either the start or the
end field and also updates the distance information in the packet. The number of
packets, X, required by the victim to reconstruct the path is bounded by
E[X] <
k · ln(k · d)
p · (1− p)d−1
where k is the number of fragments per edge and d is the distance of the attacker
from the victim. If k = 8 fragments per edge, an attacker is d = 10 hops away, and
p = 1/25, then approximately 1,200 packets on an average are required by the victim
to reconstruct the attack path.
Song and Perrig [17] use the IP identification field to encode edge information
and a distance value. They propose several algorithms for tracing the path of a packet
back to its source. Their Advanced Marking Schemes require routers to encode edge
values into the IP identification field of a packet. The identification field is sub-divided
into distance and edge fields. Each router convert’s its IP address into a set of hash
values. The packets are marked with a fixed probability, q. If a router decides to
mark a packet, it writes a hash of its IP address into the edge field and 0 into the
distance field. If the packet has already been marked by a previous router, it XORs
the existing packet marking with a different hash of its IP address and overwrites the
10
packet marking. If the router decides not to mark a packet, it always increments the
distance field. Thus, edge information is encoded into the packet.
A second algorithm proposes using a many sets of hash values and sub-dividing
the IP identification field into an edge field, a flag field (to denote which set of hash
values was used to mark the packet), and a distance field. The difference in marking
here is that the hash value to be stamped in the packet is also chosen at random.
The authors also propose an authenticated marking scheme in which routers use
time-released key chains. Packets arriving in different intervals of time are marked
using different keys.
All the algorithms proposed by Song and Perrig [17] require the victim to use a
map of the routers to reconstruct the path of the packet.
The traceback algorithms discussed so far require routers to mark packets using a
fixed, pre-determined probability. This results in a very small probability of receiving
packets having a marking of a router farther away from the victim. Thus, the victim
has to receive a large number of packets before it gets a marking by the farthest
router. Peng, Leckie and Ramamohanarao [18] propose a marking scheme wherein
routers mark the packets with a adjusted probability. The packet marking probability
is inversely proportional to the number of hops of the router from the source of the
packet. The marking probability is calculated as,
p =
1
d
(2.1)
where d is the number of hops of the router from the source of the packet.
When a router receives a packet, it decides to mark it with a probability computed
using (2.1). If it decides to mark the packet, it writes its IP address into the edge
field and zero into the distance field. If the distance field is non-zero, it combines its
IP address with the marking in the packet. A router always increments the value in
11
the distance field.
As will be shown in the following sections, using (2.1), we get a uniform proba-
bility of receiving packets marked by any router along the attack path. In addition,
the expected number of packets required by the victim for reconstruction of the at-
tack path is considerably smaller than that required by the previous scheme. The
authors propose to add an extra field in the IP option field. The path reconstruction
algorithm is not discussed.
Table I provides a qualitative comparison of the above algorithms.
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CHAPTER III
PACKET MARKING AND PATH RECONSTRUCTION
In this chapter, we discuss the specific objective of this research. We describe the
proposed algorithm in detail and analyze the proposed algorithm mathematically.
A. Problem Formulation
This research work aims at reconstructing the attack path of a Denial of Service
Attack. The path is reconstructed using IP traceback that employs adjusted proba-
bilistic packet marking.
The IP identification field is used to mark packets as they are routed. The routers
mark packets with a hash of their IP address. The marking probability depends
on how far the packet has travelled from its source. In other words, the marking
probability is not fixed, but is adjusted. At the victim, these markings are matched
against a map of the routers to reconstruct the attack path.
We assume that the routers themselves are not participating in the DoS attack.
Router markings are thus considered to be authentic.
In the sections that follow, we discuss in depth the above traceback technique
and provide a mathematical analysis of the various aspects of the algorithm.
B. IP Header
To choose a suitable field to send information useful for traceback, let us first take a
look at the IP header [5], [6] shown in Figure 2.
The various fields in an IPv4 header as follows:
1. Version: The version of IP being used (currently 4).
14
2. IP Header Length: Number of 32-bit words forming the header.
3. Type of Service: Indicates Quality of Service requirements. Usually set to 0.
4. Total Length: Total length of header and data in bytes.
5. Identification: Used for reassembly of fragmented packets in case of fragmenta-
tion.
6. Flags : Three bits (one of the 4 bits is unused) used to control whether routers
are allowed to fragment a packet and to indicate the parts of a packet to the
receiver.
7. Fragment Offset : Distance in bytes from the start of the original packet, set by
a router that performs fragmentation.
8. Time To Live: Number of hops that a packet may be routed over. Decremented
at each hop.
9. Protocol : Indicates the type of transport packet being carried, e.g. TCP, UDP,
ICMP, IGMP.
10. Header Checksum: 1’s complement checksum inserted by the sender and up-
dated whenever the packet header is modified by a router.
11. Source Address: IP address of the original source of the packet.
12. Destination Address :the IP address of the final destination of the packet.
13. Options : Provide for control functions needed or useful in some situations, not
normally used.
15
The Options field in the IP header may be used to record the route of a packet.
However, most routers drop the packet if any option is specified. Hence, it is not
feasible to use the Options field to send traceback information.
The Identification field in the IP header is the most suitable field that can be used
for our purpose. This field is normally used for reassembly of fragmented packets in
case of fragmentation. However, it has been shown [19] that a very small percentage
(less than 0.25%) of packets in the Internet are fragmented. Hence, for a vast majority
of packets, the IP identification field is irrelevant. The 16-bit IP identification field
can thus be used by routers to mark packets to send traceback information.
C. Packet Marking
The structure of the IP header has been discussed in the previous section and we saw
that the IP identification field is suited for marking packets and sending traceback
information to the victim of a DoS attack.
The IP identification field is 16 bits in length. For the purpose of traceback, we
require to fit a router marking and a distance value in this 16-bit field. Theilmann
and Rothermel [20] show that most paths in the Internet are 30 hops or less. Thus,
five bits (representing distances up to 32 hops) will suffice for our purpose. The
remaining 11 bits (giving a total of 211 = 2048 possible values) are to be used for
router markings. Figure 3 shows the modified IP identification field in the IP header.
The IP identification can now be divided into a distance field and a marking field.
An IP address is 32 bits in length. However, we only have 11 bits into which
we can write the router marking. A hash function, h(.), is used to map a router’s
32-bit IP address to a 11-bit marking value. The hash function maps the IP address
space uniformly over the 211 possible router markings. This function is a statistically
16
Fig. 3. The Modified IP Identification Field.
good random function. This means that for any input of an IP address, all of the
211 = 2048 markings are equally likely as an output. Also, each router has a marking
which is independent of the markings of all other routers. It is also assumed that the
routers are not compromised, and hence, their markings are trusted.
1. Packet Marking Probability
As mentioned in Chapter II, Peng, Leckie and Ramamohanarao [18] propose a mark-
ing probability, pd = 1/d, where d is the distance (number of hops) of the router from
the source of the packet.
Assume an attack path of length k. By this we mean that there are k routers
participating in the marking scheme between the source and the destination. Here-
after, when we say that a path is of length k, or that the attacker is k hops away
from the victim, we mean that there are k routers present in the path.
Consider the marking probability assignment,
pd =
1
d− 1 + c
(3.1)
where d− 1 is the value in the distance field of the packet received by a router d hops
away from the attack source, and c ≥ 1, c ∈ R. Later in this chapter we shall look
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at the packet marking algorithm. We will see that for a router that receives a packet
with distance field value equal to zero, we need to make the marking probability less
than or equal to 1. Hence, c ≥ 1. This parameter also controls the fraction of packets
that are marked by routers.
Let αd be the probability that the victim receives a packet marked by a router d
hops away from the attacker. Then,
αd = pd ·
k∏
i=d+1
(1− pi) (3.2)
Using (3.1),
αd =
(
1
d− 1 + c
)
.
k∏
i=d+1
(
1−
1
i− 1 + c
)
=
(
1
d− 1 + c
)
.
(
1−
1
d+ c
)
.
(
1−
1
d+ 1 + c
)
. . . .
. . . .
(
1−
1
k − 3 + c
)
.
(
1−
1
k − 2 + c
)
.
(
1−
1
k − 1 + c
)
=
(
1
d− 1 + c
)
.
(
d− 1 + c
d+ c
)
.
(
d+ c
d+ 1 + c
)
. . . .
. . . .
(
k − 4 + c
k − 3 + c
)
.
(
k − 3 + c
k − 2 + c
)
.
(
k − 2 + c
k − 1 + c
)
⇒ αd =
(
1
k − 1 + c
)
(3.3)
Thus, we see that the probability of receiving a packet marked by any router
along the attack path depends on the length of the path, not the position of the
router along the path. Also, this probability is equal for all the routers along a path.
2. Packet Marking Algorithm
Each router does a one-time calculation of its IP address hash and h(IP address),
while the distance values and their corresponding probabilities are calculated us-
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ing (3.1).
A router along a packet’s path reads the distance value in its IP identification
field. The router then looks up a table containing distance values and the corre-
sponding marking probabilities. Using this probability, it decides whether or not to
mark the packet. This decision is made as follows - the router generates a random
number. If this random number is less than or equal to the marking probability, the
packet is marked, otherwise not. If the router decides to mark the packet, it writes
its marking, h(IP address), in the IP identification field. The distance value in the
IP identification field is then incremented and the packet is routed.
If, however, the router decides not to mark the packet, it always increments the
distance value in the IP identification field and routes the packet.
The packet marking algorithm is shown in Table II.
Table II. Packet Marking Algorithm
m = h(IP address)
for each packet
read d =distance field value
generate a random number x ∈ [0, 1)
p = marking probability corresponding to d, looked up from table
if x ≤ p ( if packet is to be marked)
write m into the marking field
distance field value= d+ 1
The random number generated need not be cryptographically secure. It is a
statistically good random number and may be evaluated using time seed values in
simple random number generators.
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We should keep in mind that a router at a distance d from the attacker receives
packets with a distance field value equal to d − 1. Figure 4 illustrates this point.
Each router increments the distance field value in the packet, irrespective of whether
it marks the it or not. Consequently, for a given path, all the packets received by the
victim have a distance field value that is equal to the path length.
Fig. 4. Distance Field Values in a Packet for a Path of Length k.
D. Attack Path Reconstruction
1. Overview
To reconstruct the path of a packet and identify the source of the attack, the victim
requires a map of the routers. The victim matches packet markings with the routers
on the map and can thus reconstruct the attack path. Obtaining or constructing this
map is not difficult. A number of tools [21], [22] and [23] are available that can be
used to obtain a map of the the routers and the Internet. This map is in the form
of a directed acyclic graph, G. Readers may refer to Table III for the nomenclature
used in the following sections. The root of G is the victim. All other nodes in G are
routers. As shown in Figure 5, for each router, y, in G, denote the set of children of
that router by ρy.
During a DoS attack, the victim receives a large number of router markings.
Before we can reconstruct the attack path using these markings, we need to group
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Table III. Nomenclature
k: Attack path length
h(.): Hash function that takes a 32-bit IP address as an input
and produces a 11-bit random output
pi: Marking probability of router
αd: Probability that the victim receives a packet marked by
a router d hops away from the attacker
nk: Number of attackers k hops away from the victim in case
of a DDoS attack
µ: Set of various distance field values of packets received by the victim
λk: Set of markings received by the victim with
a distance value k ∈ µ
G: The directed acyclic graph that represents the map of the routers
ρy: Set of children of a router y in the graph, G
N : Number of possible markings = 211 = 2048
UN,k: Expected number of unique markings when k drawings are made
with replacement from a set of N different markings
mρy ,λk : Set of routers in ρy that should also be in the set λk,
or, set of routers in ρy that are actually present in the attack paths
Sd: Nodes at level d in the graph, G, that are part of the attack graph
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Fig. 5. y and ρy in the Graph, G.
the markings based on attack path lengths.
As stated in the previous section, for a single attacker, all the packets that a
victim receives have a distance field equal to the path length. Now, if there are
multiple attackers at the same distance from the victim (may have different routes),
the victim still receives all the packets with distance field containing the same attack
path length. Thus, at the victim, there will be a set of markings, each with the same
distance field value.
Consider the case when there are n multiple attackers. This now becomes a Dis-
tributed Denial of Service Attack(DDoS) scenario shown in Figure 6. Some attackers
may be at the same, and some at different distances from the victim. In this case,
there will be different sets of markings at the victim, each set containing markings
from attackers at the same distance from the victim. Let these different distance
values of packets in the sets of markings be elements of the set µ. It follows that the
victim now has | µ | different sets of markings, each set corresponding to markings on
packets sent by attackers that are at the same distance away from the victim. The
distance field value ranges from 0 ≤ k ≤ 31. Let the set of markings received by the
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Fig. 6. A Distributed Denial of Service(DDoS) Attack Scenario.
victim with a distance value k ∈ µ be denoted by λk. Denote the number of attackers
at a distance k hops away by nk. Thus, it follows that
λk = nk · k (3.4)
As an illustration, let us take a look at a scenario where there are 10 attackers.
Of these, 3 attackers are at a distance 15 from the victim, 2 attackers are at a distance
19, 1 attacker is at a distance 23 and 4 attackers are at a distance of 30 hops from
the victim. In this case, µ = {15, 19, 23, 30}; n = 10; n15 = 3, n19 = 2, n23 = 1 and
n30 = 4. This scenario is shown in Figure 7 (the number of packets shown in each set
are for illustration purposes only and are not equal to the value in (3.4)).
2. Path Reconstruction Algorithm
The path reconstruction algorithm is shown in Table IV. The graph, G, is traversed
for each set of packets having the the same distance field value (for each set λk,
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Fig. 7. Each Set of Packet Markings Has the Same Distance Field Value.
∀k ∈ µ). The starting root for the attack path is the victim. The markings of
the immediate children of the victim are checked with each marking in the set λk.
Routers whose markings match are added to the attack graph. In the next iteration,
the children of these routers are checked in a similar fashion. This process is repeated
till the depth in the graph equals the path length. The attack path is contained in
Sd, where 0 ≤ d ≤ k.
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Table IV. Path Reconstruction Algorithm
∀ k ∈ µ
S0 = victim
for d = 0 to (k − 1)
∀ y in Sd
∀ R ∈ ρy
if R ∈ λk then
insert R −→ Sd+1
output Sd
output Sk
E. Analysis
The packet marking and path reconstruction algorithms were presented in the previ-
ous sections. We now look at the computational complexities and the number false
positives that are obtained while executing these algorithms.
1. Computational Complexity
Table II shows the packet marking algorithm. Before we discuss the complexity
involved in the packet marking scheme, we first discuss the algorithm performed by
the router to route a packet without any marking scheme involved [24].
When a router receives a packet on its interface, basic checks are performed.
These include IP header validity verification, packet filtering policy and a TTL field
check.
The router then makes a routing decision based on a search of its routing table
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and determines the outbound interface and the IP address of the router that should
be the next hop in the path. Before the packet is forwarded, its TTL vale is updated
and so is the checksum.
Returning to our packet marking algorithm, the marking value,m = h(IP address)
is computed one time by a router and not on a packet-by-packet basis. The same
marking is put on all marked packets. The value in the distance field can be read at
the same time the TTL value and other IP header validity checks are performed.
After the value in the distance field has been read, the corresponding probability
is looked up from a pre-calculated table. This table may be a data structure best
optimized for the search. We know that the distance value in the packet can be one
of 32 values. Hence a simple binary search on the ordered table can provide a look-up
complexity of only O(log2 32). Or, since the number of entries to be searched is small,
the router can perform a sequential search on the entries, the entries being ordered
in decreasing order of occurrence of various path lengths in the Internet as given
in [20]. As mentioned previously, the random number used for the marking decision
is not a cryptographically secure random number. Generation of a statistically good
random number may be performed using time seed values in a simple random number
generator.
Writing the marking and incrementing the distance field value in the packet can
be done when the TTL and header checksum fields of the IP header are updated.
Hence, we see that the packet marking algorithm does not increase the routing over-
head significantly and can be implemented easily on the routers.
Observing the path reconstruction algorithm shown in Table IV, the computa-
tional complexity of the path reconstruction algorithm can be expressed as being
O
(∑
k∈µ
∑
0≤d≤k−1
[
| Sd | ·
∑
y∈Sd
[ | ρy | · log( | λk |)]
])
.
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2. Number of Packets Required for Reconstruction
We now look at the number of packets required for reconstructing the attack path.
The Coupon Collector’s problem [25] is used to find the number of packets required
for path reconstruction. This has been discussed in Appendix A. Path reconstruction
for a particular path length can only be done when the victim has received packets
marked by all the routers in the attack path.
Using the result from the Coupon Collector’s problem, (A.1), for a path of length
k, the expected number of packets required to receive markings by all the routers in
that path is bounded as follows:
E[number of packets] ≤ (k − 1 + c) · [ln(k − 1 + c)] (3.5)
For a Distributed Denial of Service attack, the number of packets required is deter-
mined using (3.5)
E[number of packets] ≤
∑
k∈µ
[
nk · (k − 1 + c) · [ln(nk · (k − 1 + c))]
]
(3.6)
3. False Positives
Referring to the attack path construction algorithm, the markings of the routers in
the graph are compared to the set of markings received by the victim for different
distance values. A false positive occurs when a reconstructed attack path is actually
not an attack path. This means that the reconstruction algorithm falsely identified a
path in the graph as being part of the DoS attack.
For all y ∈ Sd, there are some routers in ρy that are also be in the set λk. This
is the set of routers in ρy that are actually present in the attack paths. Denote these
routers by mρy ,λk , the length of the attack paths being reconstructed is k.
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For each router, y, in the graph,
| ρy ∩ λk |=| mρy ,λk |
or
| {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk |= 0
However, for a false positive, there are markings in ρy other than mρy ,λk that are also
present in λk. This can be expressed as
| {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk |≥ 1
Consider {ρy − mρy ,λk} and λk to be sets of markings that have been selected
from a possible set of N different markings. Let (ρy −mρy ,λk)1 be the first element
of the set {ρy −mρy ,λk}. The probability that this marking does not match with any
other marking in λk is equal to the probability that it belongs to the set of all possible
markings other than those present in the set λk.
Pr[ | {(ρy −mρy ,λk)1} ∩ λk |= 0] =
(
N− | λk |
N
)
Probability that no marking in {ρy−mρy ,λk} matches any marking in λk is given
by,
Pr[ | {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk |= 0] =
(
N− | λk |
N
)|{ρy−mρy,λk}|
(3.7)
From the above discussion,
Pr[ | {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk | ≥ 1] = 1− Pr[ | {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk | = 0]
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Using (3.7),
Pr[ | {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk | ≥ 1] = 1−
(
N− | λk |
N
)|{ρy−mρy,λk}|
Pr[ | {ρy −mρy ,λk} ∩ λk | ≥ 1] = 1−
(
N− | λk |
N
)(|ρy |−|mρy,λk |)
(3.8)
A false positive occurs when, at each level up to the path length, for each y,
there is at least one other element in {ρy −my,λk} that is also in λk. Using (3.8),
Pr[false positive] =
∏
y∈Sd
0≤d≤k−1
[
1−
(
N− | λk |
N
)(|ρy |−|mρy,λk |)]
(3.9)
Probability of a false positive for the Distributed Denial of Service attack is the
sum of probabilities of false positive for each path length.
Pr[false positive for DDoS attack] =
∑
∀k∈µ
∏
y∈Sd
0≤d≤k−1
[
1−
(
N− | λk |
N
)(|ρy |−|mρy,λk |)]
(3.10)
4. Number of Unique Objects
We use 11 bits of the IP identification field for the router markings. This means that
there are a total of N = 211 = 2048 possible unique markings.
The probability that the markings of two routers are the same is non-zero. This is
because the entire 32-bit IP address space is mapped to 2048 markings by the mapping
function, h(.) which can result in collisions. Hence, if we pick a set of routers, not all
corresponding markings will be unique. Intuitively, for a small selection of routers,
we can expect to have almost all unique markings. However, as the number of routers
in our selection increases, the number of duplicate markings i.e., collisions of the hash
function also increases. We now need to quantify this behavior and find the expected
number of unique markings given a particular number of routers.
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This problem can be viewed as being similar to a coupon collection problem [26]
and the results have been summarized in Appendix A.
Let UN,k be the expected number of unique markings when k drawings are made
with replacement from a set of N different markings.
Hence, using (A.3),
UN,k =
k∑
i=1
[
i.
(
N
i
)
i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
i
j
)
(i− j)k
Nk
]
(3.11)
Up until now (3.4), the definition of λk made it equal to nk ·k. We can now more
accurately define λk as being the set of unique markings received by the victim with
distance field value k.
| λk |= UN,nk·k =
nk·k∑
i=1
[
i ·
(
N
i
)
i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
i
j
)
(i− j)nk·k
Nnk·k
]
(3.12)
In the next chapter, simulation results are presented.
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CHAPTER IV
SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Overview
The proposed packet marking and attack path reconstruction algorithms, and their
mathematical analysis were presented in Chapter III. The performance of these algo-
rithms was tested using data collected from the Internet. In this chapter, we discuss
the simulation methodology and present our findings. We test and observe the per-
formance of our algorithms for the probability of receiving packets marked by routers
at various distances from the victim, the number of packets required for attack path
reconstruction and the time required for receiving packets and reconstructing the at-
tack paths. The performance of the proposed scheme is compared with the Advanced
Marking Scheme proposed by Song and Perrig [17].
B. Simulation Tools
To test and simulate the proposed algorithms, we use data collected by CAIDA’s
Skitter tool [21]1. This data is a real traceroute data set generated when each of
CAIDA’s topology monitors continuously probe various destinations in the Internet.
CAIDA’s Arts++ package [27] is used to parse and manipulate the trace data. All
simulations are performed using Network Simulator-2 (NS-2) [28].
The BRITE topology generator [29] is used to convert the trace data into a
format that is compatible with NS-2. The general simulation methodology is shown
in Figure 8. All simulations were carried out on the Linux operating system running
1The data used in this research was collected as part of CAIDA’s skitter initiative,
http://www.caida.org. Support for skitter is provided by DARPA, NSF, and CAIDA
membership.
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on a 2.40 GHz Pentium 4 system.
Fig. 8. Simulation Methodology.
C. Simulation Scenario
In Chapter III, we introduced a hash function, h(.), that maps the IP address space
over the 211 possible router markings. We use the MD5 [30] cryptographic hash of a
router’s IP address to obtain the packet marking. The hash function, h(.), returns
the last 11 bits of the MD5 cryptographic hash of the router’s IP address. This
computation is not done on a per-packet basis. Each router computes this only once,
and uses it to mark packets as necessary.
In the data set used, there are a total of 365605 different destinations at various
hop counts from the single source that probes these destinations. The distribution of
the number of hops from the source to the different destinations is shown in Figure 9.
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We can see that all paths are less than 32 hops in length. This justifies our choice of
the size of the distance field value in the IP identification field as 5 bits.
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Fig. 9. Hop Count Distribution in the Trace Data.
For the purpose of comparison, we perform a similar simulation using the Ad-
vanced Marking Scheme I (AMS) proposed by Song and Perrig [17]. For each data
point, the simulation was repeated 100 times and the average was taken as the final
result.
D. Simulation Results and Discussion
1. Marking Probability
The probability of receiving a packet marked my a router at different distances from
the victim for various attack path lengths is shown in Figure 10. We have seen earlier
in Chapter II that routers in the AMS use a fixed probability, q, to mark packets.
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The parameter c has been described in (3.1). In general, other parameters remaining
the same, lower the value of q and c, lower is the probability that a router marks a
packet it forwards. As can be seen, the proposed marking scheme provides a uniform
probability of receiving packets marked by all routers along the attack path. For AMS,
the probability of receiving packets marked by a router decreases as the distance of
the router from the victim increases. This results in a large number of packets being
required, and hence a longer delay before path reconstruction can begin.
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Fig. 10. Probability of Receiving a Packet Marked by Routers at Different Distances
from the Victim for Various Path Lengths.
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a. The parameter c
We have seen that routers mark packets with a probability that is computed us-
ing (3.1). Besides the distance field value in the IP identification field, the parameter,
c, also determines the fraction of total forwarded packets marked by a router.
For the first router in a packet’s path, the distance field value, d − 1, is zero.
This means that the router marks packets with a probability, 1/c. Thus, c solely
determines the fraction of total packets marked by the first router. This first router
is usually the gateway, or an ISP’s aggregation point. Table V shows the fraction of
packets marked for different values of c. We see that if c = 1, all the packets passing
through the router are parked. This may put an excessive load on the gateway router
and may be unjustified in the case of legitimate traffic during a non-attack period. For
c = 5, only 20% of the packets are marked. In the case of a high-volume DoS attack,
this may let through enough packets to cause problems for the victim. Hence, a
tradeoff ought to be made between the load on the routers and the number of packets
that are allowed to pass through without any markings. From our simulations, we
observed that c = 2 provides a good compromise. In a real world deployment, this
value may be a commonly agreed upon parameter for the scheme.
Table V. Fraction of Total Packets Marked by the First Router for Different Values of
c.
c percentage
c=1 100%
c=2 50%
c=5 20%
We will also see in the subsequent sections that from the victim’s perspective, the
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choice of the value of c influences only the number of expected packets required for
path reconstruction and hence the expected waiting time before path reconstruction
can commence. It has no effect on the actual path reconstruction time, or the number
of false positives.
2. Expected Number of Packets Required
Figure 11 shows the number of packets required for path reconstruction. This quantity
is important because it determines the amount of time the victim has to wait before it
can start reconstructing the attack path. In other words, it is the number of packets
required to receive markings from all the routers along the attack path. Larger the
value of this quantity, larger is the waiting time for the victim. From Figure 11, clearly,
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Fig. 11. Expected Number of Packets Required for Reconstruction.
the proposed marking algorithm requires several times lower number of packets than
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the AMS scheme. For large attack path lengths, the AMS scheme using q = 0.01
requires about 300% more packets than our proposed scheme with c = 2.
The time required to receive the expected number of packets required for recon-
struction for different path lengths and various traffic rates is shown in Figure 12. For
clarity of presentation, only our proposed algorithm with c = 2 and the AMS with
q = 0.01 are shown. Again, time required for the AMS is several times higher than
that required by our algorithm.
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Fig. 12. Time Taken to Receive the Expected Number of Packets Required for Recon-
struction for Different Path Lengths and Various Traffic Rates.
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3. Path Reconstruction Time
Figure 13 shows the attack path reconstruction time for different number of attackers.
To test the reconstruction time of our algorithm for a distributed denial of service
attack, we chose random attackers at different distances from the victim. The num-
ber of attackers at various distances have a distribution similar to Figure 14. Our
proposed mechanism performs better than the AMS for all test cases.
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Fig. 13. Path Reconstruction Time.
4. False Positives
An important metric in path reconstruction is the number of systems incorrectly
identified as attackers. These are the number of false positives obtained when re-
constructing the attack paths from the received markings. We tested our scheme for
the number of false positives obtained during reconstruction. For a single attacker,
the proposed scheme never returned a false positive for any path length. That is,
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it correctly identified a single attack source in all the trials. The AMS produced a
similar result.
To test the response of our algorithm to a distributed denial of service attack,
we chose random attackers at different distances from the victim. The number of
attackers at various distances have a distribution similar to Figure 14. In Figure 15,
we see that the proposed path reconstruction algorithm performs well under an attack
from multiple attackers and has a better performance than the AMS under similar
conditions. For a small number of attackers, the algorithm performs well. However,
as the number of attackers increases, the number of sources incorrectly identified as
attackers also increases. The false positive rate is 30% when there are 300 multiple
attack sources. This may be explained using the fact that an increase in the number
of attackers decreases the number of unique markings received. With a large number
of received router markings, the chances of having similar markings increases, hence
the high false positive rate.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A. Conclusions
This research work proposes a path reconstruction mechanism for identifying the
source of Denial of Service attacks. The proposed algorithm uses adjusted probabilis-
tic packet marking for IP traceback.
The scheme does not require any new fields in the IP header and overloads the
existing IP identification field with the router marking. A simple algorithm is used by
routers to mark packets. The markings received by the victim are used to reconstruct
the attack path using an easily available map of the Internet. In Chapter IV, we saw
that the scheme performs well in terms of time required for path reconstruction and
the number of false positives. It shows a good response against a distributed denial
of service attack.
B. Future Work
While the algorithm works well when none of the routers participating in the scheme
are compromised, the authenticity of the markings cannot be verified in case a router
itself is participating in the DoS attack. An authentication mechanism needs to be
introduced into the proposed algorithm to make it more robust against compromised
routers. This would result in a scheme that provides a good performance along with
a high degree of security.
Our scheme is not a complete solution against DoS attacks. It needs to be used
in conjunction with other filtering mechanisms such as that proposed by Yaar, Perrig
and Song [14]. Combined together, these schemes present a formidable challenge to
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the attackers, who now have to deal with a target that can not only filter out the
malicious traffic but can also pro-actively identify them.
In our scheme, routers are used to send traceback information to the victim of
a DoS attack. With some simple modifications, our scheme may also be used to
exchange covert information in steganographic applications [31], [32].
42
REFERENCES
[1] L. A. Gordon, M. P. Loeb, W. Lucyshyn, and R. Richardson, “2004 CSI/FBI
Computer Crime and Security Survey,” Computer Security Institute, June 2004,
http://www.gocsi.com.
[2] “Microsoft’s Web Site Brought Down By Attack,” [Online]. Available:
http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=12808118.
Accessed: August 2003.
[3] “Denial-of-Service attack causes web blackout,” [Online]. Available:
http://networks.silicon.com/webwatch/0,39024667,39121399,00.htm. Accessed:
June 2004.
[4] “Attacks on Windows PC’s Grew in First Half of 2004,” [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/20/technology/20secure.html. Ac-
cessed: September 2004.
[5] J. Postel, “RFC 791 - Internet Protocol,” RFC 791, September 1981,
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc791.html.
[6] A. Leon-Garcia and I. Widjaja, Communication Networks: Fundamental Con-
cepts and Key Architectures, Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill Higher Education, 1st
edition, 2000.
[7] “Defining Strategies to Protect Against TCP SYN Denial of Service Attacks,”
[Online]. Available: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/4.html. Accessed:
January 2004.
[8] J. Postel, “RFC 793 - Transmission Control Protocol,” RFC 793, September
1981, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc793.html.
43
[9] J. Postel, “RFC 768 - User Datagram Protocol,” RFC 768, August 1980,
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc768.html.
[10] J. Postel, “RFC 792 - Internet Control Message Protocol,” RFC 792, September
1981, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc792.html.
[11] P. Ferguson and D. Seniel, “RFC 2267 - Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating
Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing,” RFC 2267,
January 1998, http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2267.txt.
[12] SANS Institute, “Egress Filtering v0.2,” Global Incident Anal-
ysis Center-Special Notice, February 2000, [Online]. Available:
http://www.sans.org/y2k/egress.htm.
[13] T. M. Gil and M. Poletto, “MULTOPS: A Data-Structure for Bandwidth At-
tack Detection,” in Proc. Tenth USENIX Security Symposium, USENIX, Ed.,
Washington, D.C., USA, August 13–17 2001, pp. 23–38, USENIX.
[14] A. Yaar, A. Perrig, and D. Song, “Pi: A path identification mechanism to defend
against DDoS attacks,” in Proc. 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
Berkeley, CA, USA, May 11–14 2003, pp. 93–109, IEEE Computer Society.
[15] T. W. Doeppner, P. N. Klein, and A. Koyfman, “Using router stamping to
identify the source of IP packets,” in Proc. 7th ACM Conference on Computer
and Communications Security, Athens, Greece, November 2000, pp. 184–189,
ACM Press.
[16] S. Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson, “Practical network sup-
port for IP traceback,” in Proc. 2000 ACM SIGCOMM Conference, Stockholm,
Sweden, August 2000.
44
[17] D. X. Song and A. Perrig, “Advanced and authenticated marking schemes for
IP traceback,” in Proc. IEEE Infocom 2001, Anchorage, AK, USA, April 2001,
vol. 2, pp. 878 – 886.
[18] T. Peng, C. Leckie, and K. Ramamohanarao, “Adjusted probabilistic packet
marking for IP traceback,” in Networking 2002, Pisa, Italy, May 2002, pp. 697–
708.
[19] I. Stoica and H. Zhang, “Providing guaranteed services without per flow man-
agement,” in Proc. SIGCOMM ’99, Cambridge, MA, USA, September 1999, pp.
81–94.
[20] W. Theilmann and K. Rothermel, “Dynamic distance maps of the internet,” in
Proc. 2000 IEEE Computer and Communications Societies Conference on Com-
puter Communications (INFOCOM-00), Tel Aviv, Israel, March 26–30 2000,
pp. 275–284, IEEE.
[21] “Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) Skitter Tool,”
[Online]. Available: http://www.caida.org/tools/measurement/skitter/. Ac-
cessed: November 2003.
[22] “The NLANR Measurement and Network Analysis Group,” [Online]. Available:
http://moat.nlanr.net. Accessed: November 2003.
[23] “The Internet Mapping Project,” [Online]. Available: http://research.lum-
eta.com/ches/map/index.html. Accessed: November 2003.
[24] A. Zinin, Cisco IP Routing : Packet Forwarding and Intra-domain Routing
Protocols, Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1st edition, 2002.
45
[25] W. Feller, An Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications, vol. 1,
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., January 1968.
[26] E. Parzen, Modern Probability Theory and Its Applications, chapter 2, New
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960.
[27] “Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) arts++ pack-
age,” [Online]. Available: http://www.caida.org/tools/utilities/arts/. Accessed:
November 2003.
[28] “The Network Simulator - NS-2,” [Online]. Available: http://www.isi.edu/nsn-
am/ns/. Accessed: November 2003.
[29] “BRITE - Boston University Representative Internet Topology Generator,” [On-
line]. Available: http://www.cs.bu.edu/brite/. Accessed: November 2003.
[30] R. Rivest, “RFC 1321 - The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm,” RFC 1321, April
1992, http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc1321.html.
[31] K. Ahsan and D. Kundur, “Practical Data Hiding in TCP/IP,” in Proc. ACM
Multimedia 2002 Workshop W2 - Workshop on Multimedia and Security: Au-
thentication, Secrecy, and Steganalysis, Juan-Les-Pins, France, Dec 1–6 2002,
pp. 7–14.
[32] D. Kundur and K. Ahsan, “Practical Internet Steganography: Data Hiding
in IP,” in Proc. Texas Workshop on Security of Information Systems, College
Station, TX, USA, April 2003.
46
APPENDIX
COUPON COLLECTION PROBLEMS
Expected Number of Drawings Before We Get One Coupon of Each Type:
We now examine the classic Coupon Collector’s problem. This problem has been
discussed by Feller [25]. Assume we have a set of M distinct, equiprobable coupons.
We pick one coupon from the set, examine it and replace it back into the set. Trials
are mutually independent. We keep doing so till we get one coupon of each type. The
expected number of such drawings before we get one coupon of each type is given by
E[number of drawings] = M
[
1 +
1
2
+
1
3
+ . . .+
1
M
]
≈ M [ln(M) + γ]
≈ M ln(M) (A.1)
where γ = 0.5772 . . . is the Euler’s constant.
Expected Number of Unique Coupons :
This problem has been discussed by Parzen [26]. Suppose we have a set ofM coupons
numbered from 1 to M . We select r coupons from the set one-by-one, each time
noting the number on the coupon, and replacing it back. Selections are mutually
independent. Then, the probability that exactly m of the M integers, 1 to M will be
selected is given by
Pr[m integers selected] =
(
M
m
)
m∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
m
j
)
(m− j)r
M r
(A.2)
Using (A.2), we can find the expected number of unique integers when we select r
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coupons. This is given by
E[number of unique integers] =
r∑
i=1
[
i.Pr[i integers selected]
]
E[number of unique integers] =
r∑
i=1
[
i.
(
M
i
)
i∑
j=0
(−1)j
(
i
j
)
(i− j)r
M r
]
(A.3)
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